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WHY WE NEED A FEDERAL
REPORTER'S PRIVILEGE
Geoffrey R. Stone*
Over the past year, I have publicly criticized members of the press
for overstating their First Amendment rights and New York Times
reporter Judith Miller for refusing to abide by the rule of law. When
journalists disregard lawful court orders because they are serving a
"higher" purpose, they endanger the freedom of the press itself. At the
same time, though, the rule of law must respect the legitimate needs of a
free press. A strong and effective journalist-source privilege is essential
to a robust and independent press and to a well-functioning democratic
society.
I. THE NATURE OF A PRIVILEGE
The goal of most legal privileges is to promote open
communication in circumstances in which society wants to encourage
such communication. There are many such privileges, including the
attorney-client privilege,' the doctor-patient privilege,2  the
psychotherapist-patient privilege, 3 the privilege for confidential spousal
communications,4 the priest-penitent privilege, 5 the executive privilege,
6
* Harry Kalven, Jr. Distinguished Service Professor of Law at the University of Chicago. A
version of this essay was presented as testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee on July 20,
2005.
1. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1980).
2. See, e.g., Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980) (contrasting spousal privilege
with other categories of testimonial privilege, including that applicable to physician-patient
relationships).
3. See, e.g., Jaffe v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 15 (1996).
4. See, e.g., Trammel, 445 U.S. at 53.
5. See New York v. Phillips (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. 1813), reprinted in Privileged
Communications to Clergymen, I CATH. LAW. 199, 199-209 (1955).
6. See generally United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1973).
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the "Speech or Debate Clause" privilege for members of Congress,7 and
so on.
In each of these instances, three judgments implicitly support
recognition of the privilege: (1) the relationship is one in which open
communication is important to society; (2) in the absence of a privilege,
such communication will be inhibited; and (3) the cost to the legal
system of losing access to the privileged information is outweighed by
the benefit to society of open communication in the protected
relationship.
Consider, for example, the psychotherapist-patient privilege. If
patients know that their psychotherapists could routinely disclose or be
compelled to disclose their confidential communications made for the
purpose of treatment, they would naturally be more reluctant to reveal
intimate or embarrassing facts about their experiences, thoughts, and
beliefs. But without those revelations, psychotherapists would be
hindered in their ability to offer appropriate advice and treatment to their
patients. To facilitate treatment, we might create a privilege that
prohibits psychotherapists from disclosing confidential matters revealed
to them by their patients, unless the patient elects to waive the privilege.
Suppose, for example, Patient tells Psychotherapist that he was
sexually abused by Teacher several years earlier. Teacher is now under
investigation for sexual abuse of his students, and Psychotherapist is
called to testify before the grand jury. Psychotherapist is asked, "Did
Patient tell you he had been sexually abused by Teacher?" If a
psychotherapist-patient privilege exists in the jurisdiction,
Psychotherapist will be barred from answering the question without
Patient's permission. The effect of the privilege is to deprive the
investigation of relevant evidence in order to promote open
communication in the treatment setting.
At this point, it is important to note a critical feature of privileges.
If Patient would not have disclosed this information to Psychotherapist
in the absence of a psychotherapist-patient privilege, then the criminal
investigation loses nothing because of the privilege. This is so because,
without the privilege, Psychotherapist would not have learned about
Teacher's abuse of Patient in the first place. In that circumstance, the
privilege creates the best of all possible outcomes: it promotes effective
treatment at no cost to the legal system.
Of course, it is not that simple. It is impossible to measure precisely
the cost of privileges to the legal process. If Patient would have revealed
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 179 (1966).
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the information to Psychotherapist even without the privilege, then the
privilege imposes a cost because it shields from disclosure a
communication that would have been made even in the absence of a
privilege. The ideal rule would privilege only those communications that
would not have been made without the privilege.
This highlights another important feature of privileges: the privilege
"belongs" to the person whose communication society wants to
encourage (i.e., the client or patient), not to the attorney or doctor.8 If the
client or patient is indifferent to the confidentiality of the communication
at the time it is made, or elects to waive the privilege at any time, the
attorney or doctor has no authority to assert the privilege. 9 The attorney
or doctor is merely the agent of the client or patient.'o
II. THE JOURNALIST-SOURCE PRIVILEGE
The logic of the journalist-source privilege is similar to that
described above. Public policy certainly supports the idea that
individuals who possess information of significant value to the public
should ordinarily be encouraged to convey that information to the
public. We acknowledge and act upon this policy in many ways,
including, for example, by providing copyright protection.'I
Sometimes, though, individuals who possess such information are
reluctant to have it known that they are the source. They may fear
retaliation, gaining a reputation as a "snitch," losing their privacy, or
simply getting "involved." A congressional staffer, for example, may
have reason to believe that a Senator has taken a bribe. She may want
someone to investigate, but may not want to get personally involved. Or,
an employee of a corporation may know that his employer is
manufacturing an unsafe product, but may not want coworkers to know
he was the source of the leak.
In such circumstances, individuals may refuse to disclose the
information unless they have some way to protect their confidentiality.
In our society, often the best way to reveal such information is through
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (1983); see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS'N,
Statement of Client's Rights (2005) (adopting the standards suggested by the ABA).
9. See Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 381 F.2d 551, 556 (2d Cir. 1967); 8 JOHN
HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2321 (John T. McNaughton ed.,
1961).
10. The attorney-client privilege is recognized in every jurisdiction in the United States. Other
privileges are recognized in varying forms in different jurisdictions.
11. See, e.g., Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
2005]
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the press. But without a journalist-source privilege, such sources may
decide silence is the better part of wisdom.
A journalist-source privilege thus makes sense for the same reason
as the attorney-client privilege, the doctor-patient privilege, and the
psychotherapist-patient privilege. It is in society's interest to encourage
the communication, and without a privilege the communication will
often be chilled. Moreover, in many instances the privilege will impose
no cost on the legal system, because without the privilege the source
may never disclose the information at all. Consider the congressional
staffer example. Without a privilege, the staffer may never report the
bribe and the crime will remain undetected. With the privilege, the
source will speak with the journalist, who may publish the story, leading
to an investigation that may uncover the bribe. In this situation, law
enforcement is actually better with the privilege than without it, and this
puts to one side the benefit to society of learning of the alleged bribe
independent of any criminal investigation.
For this reason, forty-nine states and the District of Columbia
recognize some version of the journalist-source privilege either by
statute or common law. 12 It is long past time for the federal government
to enact such a privilege as well. There is no sensible reason for the
federal system not to recognize a journalist-source privilege to deal with
situations like the whistleblower examples of the congressional staffer
and the corporate employee. In these circumstances, the absence of a
journalist-source privilege harms the public interest. There are, of
12. Thirty-one states have recognized the privilege by statute. See, ALA. CODE § 12-21-142
(2005); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.320 (2005); ARIZ REV. STAT. § 12-2214 (LexisNexis 2005); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-85-510 (2005); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1070 (Deering 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-
90-119 (2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 § 4321 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (LexisNexis
2005); GA. CODE. ANN. § 24-9-30 (2005); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8-901 (LexisNexis 2005);
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-46-4-2 (LexisNexis 2005); KY. REV, STAT. ANN. § 42 1.100 (LexisNexis
2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45:1452 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-112
(LexisNexis 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 767.5a (LexisNexis 2005); MINN. STAT. § 595.022
(2004); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-902 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-144 (LexisNexis 2005);
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49.275 (LexisNexis 2005); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-21.9 (West 2005);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-6-7 (LexisNexis 2005); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 79-h (2005); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 8-53.11 (2005); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-01-06.2 (2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.12
(LexisNexis 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (West 2004); OR. REV. STAT. § 44.520
(2003); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5942 (2005); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-19.1-2 (2005); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 19-11-100 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-208 (2005). Eighteen states have recognized it by
judicial decision. See, e.g., Jean-Paul Jassy, The Prosecutor's Subpoena and the Reporter's
Privilege, COMMC'N. LAW., Winter 2000, at n.25, available at
http://www.abanet.org/forums/communication/comlawyer/winter00/jassy.html (citing to case law of
eight states that have recognized the privilege via judicial decision). The only state that has not
recognized the privilege in any form is Wyoming.
[Vol. 34:39
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course, more difficult cases, and I will return to them later. But some
form of journalist-source privilege is essential to foster the fundamental
value of an informed citizenry.
Moreover, the absence of a federal privilege creates an intolerable
situation for both journalists and sources. Consider a reporter who works
in New York whose source is willing to tell her about an unsafe product,
but only if the reporter promises him confidentiality. New York has a
shield law, but the federal government does not. If the disclosure results
in litigation or prosecution in the state courts of New York, the reporter
can protect the source, but if the litigation or prosecution is in federal
court, the reporter cannot invoke the privilege. This generates
uncertainty, and uncertainty breeds silence. The absence of a federal
privilege directly undermines the policies of forty-nine states and the
District of Columbia and wreaks havoc on the legitimate and good-faith
understandings and expectations of sources and reporters throughout the
nation. This is an unnecessary, intolerable and, indeed, irresponsible
state of affairs.
III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
One response to the call for federal legislation in this area is that
such a law is unnecessary because the First Amendment should solve the
problem. This is wrong at many levels.1 3 Most obviously, constitutional
law sets a minimum baseline for the protection of individual liberties. It
does not define the ceiling of such liberties. 14 That a particular practice
or policy does not violate the Constitution does not mean it is good
policy. This is evident in an endless list of laws that go far beyond
constitutional requirements in supporting individual rights, ranging from
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,15 to legislative restrictions on certain
surveillance practices,16 to tax exemptions for religious organizations,'
7
to regulations of the electoral process.18
Moreover, the journalist-source privilege poses not only a question
of individual liberties, but also an important public policy issue about
how best to support and strengthen the marketplace of ideas. Just as the
13. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 697 (1972).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854, 859 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing McNabb v.
United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340 (1943)).
15. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
16. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1) (2000).
17. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
18. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 4086 (2000).
20051
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non-constitutional attorney-client privilege is about promoting a healthy
legal system,19 the non-constitutional journalist-source privilege is about
fostering a healthy political system.
Returning to the First Amendment, in 1972 the Supreme Court, in
Branzburg v. Hayes,20 addressed the question of whether the First
Amendment embodies a journalist-source privilege. 1 The four
dissenting justices concluded that "when a reporter is asked to appear
before a grand jury and reveal confidences," the government should be
required to:
(1) show that there is probable cause to believe that the newsman has
information that is clearly relevant to a specific probable violation of
law; (2) demonstrate that the information sought cannot be obtained by
alternative means less destructive of First Amendment rights; and (3)
demonstrate a compelling and overriding interest in the information.
The opinion of the Court, however, rejected this conclusion and
held that, as long as an investigation is conducted in good faith and not
for the purpose of disrupting "a reporter's relationship with his news
sources," the First Amendment does not protect either the source or the
reporter from having to disclose relevant information to a grand jury.23
If this were all there were to Branzburg, it clearly would seem to
have settled the First Amendment issue. But Justice Powell did
something quite puzzling, for he not only joined the opinion of the
Court, but also filed a separate concurring opinion that seemed directly
at odds with the Court's opinion.24 Specifically, Powell stated that in
each case the "asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts
by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to
criminal conduct. 25
Thus, Justice Powell seemed to embrace an approach between that
of the four justices in dissent and the four other justices in the majority.
Had he not joined the majority opinion, his concurring opinion, as the
"swing" opinion, would clearly have stated the "law," even though no
19. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 IOWA L. REV. 351, 356 (1988)
(noting that the attorney-client privilege "protects clients and benefits society by enabling the legal
system to work").
20. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
21. See id. at 667.
22. Id. at 743 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
23. Id. at 707-08.
24. See id. at 709 (Powell, J., concurring).
25. Id. at 710.
[Vol. 34:39
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other justice agreed with him. But because he joined the opinion of the
Court, no one has ever been quite sure what to make of his position. The
result has been chaos in the lower federal courts about the extent to
which the First Amendment embodies a journalist-source privilege. 26 Is
there essentially no privilege, as suggested in the majority opinion, or is
Powell's balancing approach the constitutional test? For more than thirty
years, the Court has allowed this confusion to percolate in the lower
federal courts.
This is another reason why a federal statute is necessary. We have
lived too long with this uncertainty. The current state of affairs leaves
sources, journalists, prosecutors, and lower federal courts without any
clear guidance, and the scope of the First Amendment-based journalist-
source privilege differs significantly from one part of the nation to
another.27 A federal law recognizing a journalist-source privilege would
eliminate this confusion and offer much-needed guidance about the
degree of confidentiality participants in the federal system may and may
not expect. Especially in situations like these, where individuals are
making difficult decisions about whether to put themselves at risk by
revealing information of significant value to the public, clear rules are
essential.
This brings me back to the relationship between constitutional law
and federal legislation. If a robust journalist-source privilege is not
required by the First Amendment, why (apart from considerations of
uniformity) should Congress enact a privilege that goes beyond
whatever the Court held in Branzburg? Beyond the point made earlier
that the Constitution does not exhaust sound public policy, the Court in
Branzburg relied heavily on two important First Amendment doctrines
to justify its decision, neither of which is relevant to the issue of federal
legislation. 28 Indeed, that is why, despite Branzburg, forty-nine states
26. Building upon Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Branzburg, most federal courts of
appeals have held that the First Amendment protects some form of journalist-source privilege. See,
e.g., LaRouche v. Nat'l Broad. Co., 780 F.2d 1134, 1139 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Caporale,
806 F.2d 1487, 1504 (lth Cir. 1986); Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 711-12 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
Bruno & Stillman, Inc. v. Globe Newspaper Co., 633 F.2d 583, 594-95 (1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 357 (3d Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d
721, 725 (5th Cir. 1980); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 563 F.2d 433, 437 (10th Cir. 1977); Farr
v. Pitchess, 522 F.2d 464, 467 (9th Cir. 1975); Baker v. F & F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2d
Cir. 1972).
27. Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.04 (LexisNexis 2005) (protecting the source of
the information), with OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2506 (2004) (protecting unpublished
information, as well as the source).
28. See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684 (providing "that the First Amendment does not guarantee
the press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public
20051
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and the District of Columbia have felt comfortable recognizing some
form of the journalist-source privilege.
First, as a general matter of First Amendment interpretation, the
Court is reluctant to invalidate a law merely because it has an incidental
effect on First Amendment freedoms. 29 Laws that directly regulate
expression (e.g., "No one may criticize the government" or "No one may
distribute leaflets at the Mall") are the central concern of the First
Amendment. 30 Laws that only incidentally affect free expression (e.g., a
speed limit as applied to someone who speeds to get to a demonstration
or to express his opposition to speed limits) will almost never violate the
First Amendment. 31 Except in highly unusual circumstances, in which
the application of such a law would have a devastating effect on these
freedoms,32  the Court routinely rejects such First Amendment
challenges.33
The reason for this doctrine is not that such laws cannot dampen
First Amendment freedoms, but that the implementation of a
constitutional analysis that allowed every law to be challenged whenever
it allegedly impinged even indirectly on someone's freedom of
expression would be a judicial nightmare. Does an individual have a
First Amendment right not to pay taxes, because taxes reduce the
amount of money she has available to support political causes? Does an
individual have a First Amendment right to violate a law against public
generally"); see also id. at 682 (noting "that the First Amendment does not invalidate every
incidental burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal statutes
of general applicability").
29. See id at 682.
30. See generally Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Terminiello v. City of Chicago,
337 U.S. 1, 2-3 (1949).
31. See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 402-06 (1989); United States v. O'Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968).
32. See, e.g., NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958) (holding that for the state to
require the NAACP to disclose its membership lists in Alabama at the height of the civil rights
movement would effectively destroy the NAACP's ability to operate).
33. See, e.g., Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986) (upholding as an
"incidental" restriction on speech a law requiring the closing of any building used for prostitution,
as applied to an "adult" bookstore); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 614 (1985) (upholding as
an "incidental" restriction on speech the government's policy of enforcing the selective service
registration requirement only against those men who advised the government that they had failed to
register or who were reported by others as having failed to register); Citizen Publishing Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139 (1969) (upholding the Sherman Antitrust Act, as applied to the
press); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 385 (upholding as an "incidental" restriction on speech a federal law
prohibiting any individual to destroy a draft card, as applied to an individual who burned a draft
card to protest the Vietnam War); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 193
(1946) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act, as applied to the press); see generally Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 46, 99-114 (1987).
[Vol. 34:39
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urination, because he wants to urinate on a public building to express his
hostility to government policy? Does a reporter have a First Amendment
right to violate laws against burglary or wiretapping, because burglary
and wiretapping will enable him to get an important story?
To avoid such intractable and ad hoc line-drawing, the Court
simply presumes that laws of general application are constitutional, even
as applied to speakers and journalists, except in extraordinary
circumstances.34 Predictably, the Court invoked this principle in
Branzburg: "[T]he First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental
burdening of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or
criminal statutes of general applicability. 35
This is a sound basis for the Court to be wary of constitutionalizing
a strong journalist-source privilege, but it has no weight in the legislative
context. Courts necessarily proceed on the basis of precedent, and they
are quite sensitive to the dangers of "slippery slopes." Legislation,
however, properly considers problems "one step at a time" and
legislators need not reconcile each law with every other law in order to
meet their responsibilities.
For the Court to recognize a journalist-source privilege but not, for
example, a privilege of journalists to commit burglary or wiretapping,
would pose a serious challenge to the judicial process. But for Congress
to address the privilege issue without fretting over journalistic burglary
or wiretapping is simply not a problem. This is a fundamental difference
between the judicial and legislative processes.
Second, recognition of a journalist-source privilege necessarily
requires someone to determine who, exactly, is a "journalist." For the
Court to decide this question as a matter of First Amendment
interpretation would fly in the face of more than two hundred years of
constitutional wisdom. The idea of defining or "licensing" the press in
this manner is anathema to our constitutional traditions. The Court has
never gone down this road, and with good reason. As the Court observed
in Branzburg, if the Court recognized a First Amendment privilege "it
would be necessary to define those categories of newsmen who qualified
for the privilege, a questionable procedure in light of the traditional
doctrine that liberty of the press is the right of the lonely
pamphleteer... just as much as of the large metropolitan
publisher .... ,,36
34. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991); Associated Press v.
NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937).
35. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972).
36. Id. at 704.
20051
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Although this was a serious constraint on the Court in Branzburg, it
poses a much more manageable issue in the context of legislation.
Government often treats different speakers and publishers differently
from one another. Which reporters are allowed to attend a White House
press briefing? Which are eligible to be embedded with the military?
Broadcasting is regulated,37 but print journalism is not. Legislation treats
the cable medium differently from both broadcasting and print
journalism. These categories need not conform perfectly to the
undefined phrase "the press" in the First Amendment. Differentiation
among different elements of the media is constitutional, as long as it is
not based on viewpoint or any other invidious consideration, and as long
as the differentiation is reasonable. 38 Whereas the Court is wisely
reluctant to define "the press" for purposes of the First Amendment, it
will grant Congress considerable deference in deciding who, as a matter
of sound public policy, should be covered by the journalist-source
privilege.
Thus, the primary reasons relied upon by the Court in Branzburg
for its reluctance to recognize a robust First Amendment journalist-
source privilege do not stand in the way of legislation to address the
issue. To the contrary, the very weaknesses of the judicial process that
make it difficult for a court to address this problem as a constitutional
matter are precisely the strengths of Congress to address it well as a
legislative matter.
IV. THE COSTS OF A JOURNALIST-SOURCE PRIVILEGE
The primary argument against any privilege is that it deprives the
judicial or other investigative process of relevant evidence. Of course,
there is nothing novel about that. Almost all rules of evidence deprive
the fact-finder of relevant evidence. This is true not only of privileges,
but also of rules against hearsay and opinion evidence, rules excluding
proof of repairs and compromises, the exclusionary rule, the privilege
against compelled self-incrimination, and rules protecting trade secrets
and the identity of confidential government agents. This is so because
the law of evidence inherently involves trade-offs between the needs of
37. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000).
38. See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643-45 (1994) (upholding "must
carry" provisions that favored broadcast over cable programmers); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S.
439, 444 (1991) (upholding a state law exempting newspapers and magazines but not cable
television from a gross receipts tax); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-87 (1969)
(upholding regulations for broadcasting that would be unconstitutional for print media).
[Vol. 34:39
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the judicial process and competing societal interests. But it is important
to recognize that there is nothing unique about this feature of privileges.
A central question in assessing any such rule is how much relevant
evidence will be lost if the rule is enacted. It is impossible to know this
with any exactitude, because this inquiry invariably involves unprovable
counter-factuals. But, as noted earlier, privileges have a distinctive
feature in this regard that must be carefully considered.39
If, in any given situation, we focus on the moment the privilege is
invoked (for example, when the reporter refuses to disclose a source to a
grand jury), the cost of the privilege will seem high, because we appear
to be "losing" something quite tangible because of the privilege. But if
we focus on the moment the source speaks with the reporter, we will see
the matter quite differently.
Assume a particular source will not disclose confidential
information to a reporter in the absence of a privilege. If there is no
privilege, the source will not reveal the information, the reporter will not
be able to publish the information, the reporter will not be called to
testify before the grand jury, and the grand jury will not learn the
source's identity. Thus, in this situation, the absence of the privilege will
deprive the grand jury of the exact same evidence as the privilege. But at
least with the privilege, the public and law enforcement will gain access
to the underlying information through the newspaper report. In this
situation, the privilege is costless to the legal system, and at the same
time provides significant benefits both to law enforcement and the
public.
Of course, some, perhaps many, sources will reveal information to
a reporter even without a privilege. It is the evidentiary loss of those
disclosures that is the true measure of the cost of the privilege. The same
analysis holds for other privileges as well, such as attorney-client and
doctor-patient. It is essential to examine the privilege in this manner in
order to understand the actual impact of the journalist-source privilege.
Here are two ways to assess the relative costs and benefits. (1) On
balance, it is probably the case that the most important confidential
communications, the ones that are of greatest value to the public, are
those that would get the source in the most "trouble." Thus, the absence
of a privilege is most likely to chill the most valuable disclosures. (2) If
one compares criminal prosecutions in states with an absolute privilege
with those in states with only a qualified privilege, there is almost
certainly no measurable difference in the effectiveness of law
39. See supra Part 1.
2005]
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enforcement. Even though there may be a difference in the outcomes of
a few idiosyncratic cases, the existence of even an absolute privilege
probably has no discernable effect on the legal system as a whole. If we
focus, as we should, on these large-scale effects, rather than on a few
highly unusual cases when the issue captures the public's attention, it
seems clear that the benefits we derive from the privilege significantly
outweigh its negative effects on law enforcement. This is so because the
percentage of cases in which the issue actually arises is vanishingly
small4° and because, in serious cases, prosecutors are almost always able
to use alternative ways to investigate the crime.
My conclusion, then, like that of forty-nine states and the District of
Columbia, is that public policy strongly supports the recognition of a
journalist-source privilege. Indeed, the absence of a federal journalist-
source privilege seems inexplicable.
V. FRAMING A FEDERAL JOURNALIST-SOURCE PRIVILEGE
Many issues arise in framing such a privilege. I will address three
of them here: Who can invoke the privilege? Should the privilege be
absolute? What if the disclosure by the source is itself a crime?
A. Who Can Invoke the Privilege?
At the outset, it must be recalled that the privilege belongs to the
source, not to the reporter. When the reporter invokes the privilege, she
is merely acting as the agent of the source.4' With that in mind, the
40. For example, a Lexis-Nexis search for cases in New York state-a state with a statutory
shield law-using the terms "confidential and OVERVIEW (§ 79-h)" during the time period
spanning January 1975 and January 1990, produces sixteen results. LEXISNEXIS: NY STATE CASES,
COMBINED Database (last searched Nov. 1, 2005), available at LEXISNEXIS:NYCTS/search:
"confidential and overview (see 79-h) and date(geq (1/1/1975) and leq (1/1/1990))". However, a
search for cases during the subsequent fifteen-year period, January 1990 through January 2005,
produces only seven results. LEXISNEXIS: NY STATE CASES, COMBINED Database (last searched
Nov. 1, 2005), available at LEXISNEXIS:NYCTS/search: "confidential and overview (see 79-h)
and date(geq (1/1/1990) and leq (1/1/2005))".
41. In several cases, courts have held that the journalist-source privilege belongs to the
reporter and cannot be waived by the source. See, e.g., United States v. Cuthbertson, 630 F.2d 139,
147 (3d Cir. 1980); Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 103 F.R.D. 410, 413 (D.D.C. 1984); Los Angeles Mem'l
Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 89 F.R.D. 489, 494 (C.D. Cal. 1981). This view of the privilege seems
to assume that the primary purpose of the privilege is to maintain the independence of the press
rather than to encourage open communication by sources. This view makes sense insofar as the
issue is whether journalists should enjoy a "work product" privilege analogous to the attorney's
work product doctrine. To the extent such a doctrine applies to journalists, it would then be
necessary to define precisely who is a journalist. Proposals for a "work product" doctrine for
journalists generally assume that a qualified privilege would be adequate to protect this interest, as it
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question should properly be rephrased as follows: To whom may a
source properly disclose information in reasonable reliance on the belief
that the disclosure will be protected by the journalist-source privilege?
The answer should be a functional one. The focus should not be on
whether the reporter fits within any particular category. Rather, the
source should be protected whenever he makes a confidential disclosure
to an individual, reasonably believing that that individual regularly
disseminates information to the general public, when the source's
purpose is to enable that individual to disseminate the information to the
general public.
Such a definition does not resolve every possible problem of
interpretation. "General public," for example, should include specific
communities, such as a university or a specialized set of readers. But the
essence of the definition is clear. What we should be most concerned
about are the reasonable expectations of the source, rather than the
formal credentials of the recipient of the information.
B. Absolute or Qualified Privilege?
Thirty-six states have some form of qualified journalist-source
privilege. 42 In these states, the government can require the journalist to
reveal the confidential information if the government can show that it
has exhausted alternative ways of obtaining the information and that the
is in the attorney work product situation. See, e.g., Free Speech Protection Act of 2005, S. 369,
109th Cong. (2005) (proposed by Senator Dodd).
On the attorney work product doctrine, see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11
(1947).
[l]t is essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from
unnecessary intrusion by opposing parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a
client's case demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to be the
relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without
undue and needless interference .... This work is reflected, of course, in interviews,
statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs,
and countless other tangible and intangible ways .... Were such materials open to
opposing counsel on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would
remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, heretofore inviolate, would not be his own.
Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of
legal advice and in the preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession
would be demoralizing. And the interests of the clients and the cause of justice would be
poorly served.
Id.
42. Eighteen states have a qualified statutory privilege, including Alaska, -Arizona, Arkansas,
Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee. Another
eighteen states have a qualified judicial privilege. See supra note 12.
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information is necessary to serve a substantial government interest. 43
There are many different variations of this formulation, but this is the
essence of it. The logic of the qualified privilege is that it appears never
to deny the government access to information that the government really
"needs." Correlatively, it appears to protect the privilege when breaching
it would serve no substantial government interest. As such, it appears to
be a sensible compromise. Nothing could be farther from the truth.
Although the qualified privilege has a superficial appeal, it is
deeply misguided. It purports to achieve the best of both worlds, but
probably achieves the opposite. For quite persuasive reasons, other
privileges, such as the attorney-client, doctor-patient, psychotherapist-
patient, and priest-penitent privileges, which are deeply rooted in our
national experience, do not allow such ad hoc determinations of "need"
to override the privilege. a
The qualified privilege rests on the illusion that the costs and
benefits of the privilege can properly be assessed at the moment the
privilege is asserted. 45 But as I have indicated earlier, this is false. it
blinks the reality that the real impact of the privilege must be assessed,
not when the privilege is asserted, but when the source speaks with the
reporter. By focusing on the wrong moment in time, the qualified
privilege ignores the disclosures it prevents from ever occurring. That is,
it disregards the cost to society of all the disclosures that sources do not
make because they are chilled by the uncertainty of the qualified
privilege. It is thus premised on a distorted "balancing" of the competing
societal interests.
Moreover, the qualified privilege undermines the very purpose of
the journalist-source privilege. Imagine yourself in the position of a
source. You are a congressional staffer who has reason to believe a
Senator has taken a bribe. You want to reveal this to a journalist, but you
do not want to be known as "loose-lipped" or "disloyal." You face the
prospect of a qualified privilege. At the moment you speak with the
reporter, it is impossible for you to know whether, four months hence,
some prosecutor will or will not be able to make the requisite showing to
pierce the privilege. This puts you in a craps-shoot.
43. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-90-119 (2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015 (LexisNexis
2005).
44. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1,2, 17-18 (1995).
45. See id at 2, 17-18; Anne W. Robinson, Evidentiary Privileges and the Exclusionary Rule:
Dual Justifications for an Absolute Rape Victim Counselor Privilege, 31 NEw ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV.
CONFINEMENT 331, 338 (2005).
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But the very purpose of the privilege is to encourage sources to
disclose useful information to the public. The uncertainty surrounding
the application of the qualified privilege directly undercuts this purpose
and is grossly unfair to sources, whose disclosures we are attempting to
induce. In short, the qualified privilege is a bad business all around. And
that is precisely why other privileges are not framed in this manner.
Does this mean the journalist-source privilege must be absolute?
Thirteen states and the District of Columbia have reached this
conclusion.46 And, indeed, there is considerable virtue in a simple,
straightforward, unambiguous privilege. At the same time, however,
there may be some narrowly-defined circumstances in which it may
seem quite sensible to breach the privilege.
For example, if a journalist broadcasts information, obtained from a
confidential source, about a grave crime or serious breach of national
security that is likely to be committed imminently, it may seem
irresponsible to privilege the identity of the source. More concretely,
suppose a reporter broadcasts a news alert that, according to a reliable,
confidential source, a major terrorist attack will strike New York the
next day, and law enforcement authorities want the reporter to reveal the
name of the source so they can attempt to track him down to possibly
prevent the attack. Is this a sufficiently compelling justification to
override the privilege? It would certainly seem so, and this would be
analogous to the rule in the psychotherapist-patient context that voids the
privilege if the psychotherapist learns that her patient intends
imminently to inflict serious harm on himself or others.4 7
But even in this situation the matter is not free from doubt. It must
be borne in mind that, as a practical matter, without an absolute privilege
the source might not be willing to disclose this information. Thus, in the
long-run, this exception could well hinder rather than support law
enforcement. Public officials are better off knowing that a threat exists,
even if they do not know the identity of the source, than knowing
nothing at all. Thus, breaching the privilege in even this seemingly
compelling situation may actually prove counterproductive. It is for this
reason that the attorney-client privilege generally provides that no
48showing of need is sufficient to pierce the privilege. Apart from this
46. The thirteen states with an absolute privilege are Alaska, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky,
Maryland, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Ohio, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Chase, 340 F.3d 978, 984 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that "[m]ost
states have a dangerous-patient exception to their psychotherapist-patient confidentiality laws").
48. See, e.g., Admiral Ins. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 881 F.2d 1486, 1495 (9th Cir. 1989)
(opining that the attomey-client privilege cannot be vitiated by a claim that the information sought
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very narrowly-defined exception, however, an absolute privilege will
best serve the overall interests of society.
C. What if the Source's Disclosure is Itself Unlawful?
A relatively rare, but interesting twist occurs when the source's
disclosure is itself a criminal act. Suppose, for example, a government
employee unlawfully reveals to a reporter classified information that the
United States has broken a terrorist code or confidential information
about a private individual's tax return. As we have seen, the primary
purpose of the privilege is to encourage sources to disclose information
to journalists because such disclosures promote the public interest. But
when the act of disclosure is itself unlawful, the law has already
determined that the public interest cuts against disclosure. It would thus
seem perverse to allow a journalist to shield the identity of a source
whose disclosure is itself punishable as a criminal act. The goal of the
privilege is to foster whistle-blowing and other lawful disclosures, not to
encourage individuals to use the press to commit criminal acts.4 9
A rule that excluded all unlawful disclosures from the scope of the
journalist-source privilege would be consistent with other privileges. A
client who consults an attorney in order to figure out how to commit the
perfect murder is not protected by the attorney-client privilege, 50 and a
patient who consults a doctor in order to learn how best to defraud an
insurance company is not protected by the doctor-patient privilege. And
this is so regardless of whether the attorney or doctor knew of the
client's or patient's intent at the time of the conversation.5 1 Such use of
doctors and lawyers is not what those privileges are designed to
encourage.
By the same reasoning, a source whose disclosure is unlawful is not
engaging in conduct that society intends to encourage. To the contrary,
the very purpose of prohibiting the disclosure is to discourage such
is unavailable from any other source, for "[s]uch an exception either would destroy the privilege or
render it so tenuous and uncertain that it would be 'little better than no privilege at all').
49. An interesting question is whether the same principle should apply when the leak is not a
crime, but a tort. For example, suppose a confidential source makes a false statement of fact to a
newspaper, which publishes the statement, attributing it to a confidential source. Can the newspaper
be compelled to reveal the identity of the source on the theory that there is no public policy to
encourage people to make false statements of fact to newspapers?
50. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); Harry I. Subin, The Lawyer as
Superego: Disclosure of Client Confidences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1091, 1113-17
(1985).
51. See, e.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (noting that professional standards
for attorneys prohibit assisting conduct they know to be illegal).
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conduct. It would therefore seem sensible to conclude that such a source
is not entitled to the protection of the journalist-source privilege.
There are, however, several objections to such a limitation on the
privilege. In some circumstances, it may not be clear to the reporter, or
even to the source, whether the disclosure is unlawful. Because of the
complexity of the relevant criminal statute, this may have been the case
in the Lewis Libby/Matt Cooper situation.52 If the privilege does not
cover unlawful disclosures, but it is unclear whether a particular
disclosure is unlawful, how is the reporter to know whether to promise
confidentiality?
The answer is simple. As in all privilege situations, a promise of
confidentiality should be understood as binding only to the extent
allowed by law. A similar question may arise in the imminent crime/
national security situation. Ultimately, it is for the court, not the reporter,
to resolve these issues. In the unlawful disclosure context, the court
should protect the privilege unless it finds that the source knew or should
have known that the disclosure was unlawful.
A second objection to an unlawful disclosure limitation is that some
unlawful disclosures involve information of substantial public value.
The Pentagon Papers case 53 is a classic illustration. Although the
government can ordinarily punish an employee who unlawfully leaks
classified information, 54 it does not necessarily follow that the privilege
should be breached if the information revealed is of substantial value to
the public. This is a difficult and tricky question.
In the context of unlawful leaks, the journalist-source privilege may
be seen as an intermediate case. On the one hand, government
employees ordinarily can be punished for violating reasonable
confidentiality restrictions with respect to information they learn during
the course of their employment. 55 On the other hand, the media
ordinarily may publish information they learn from an unlawful leak,
unless the publication creates a clear and present danger of a grave harm
52. See Jim VandeHei & Mike Allen, Bush Raises Threshold for Firing Aides in Leak Probe,
WASH. POST, July 19, 2005, at AOl; see also Michael Duffy, Let's Make a Deal, TIME, Oct. 10,
2005, at 15; Diedtra Henderson, Reporter Ties Cheney Aide to CIA Story, BOSTON GLOBE, July 18,
2005, at Al; Anne E. Kornblut, At Milestone in Inquiry, Rove, and the G.O.P., Breathe a Bit Easier,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2005, at Al.
53. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam).
54. It is important to note that if the leaker cannot constitutionally be punished for the leak,
then the leak is not unlawful, and this entire analysis is irrelevant.
55. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 507-08, 510 (1980) (per curiam)
(upholding a restriction on the publication by a former CIA agent of information learned during the
course of his employment by the CIA).
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to the nation.56 The journalist-source privilege falls between these two
rules. Because the leak is unlawful, it seems perverse to shield the
source's identity. But because the press has a constitutional right to
publish the information, it seems perverse to require the press to identify
the source.
The best resolution is to uphold the privilege if the unlawful leak
discloses information of substantial public value. This strikes a
reasonable balance between full protection of the source's identity and
no protection of his identity, based on the contribution of the leak to
public debate. To illustrate what I mean by "substantial public value," I
would place the Pentagon Papers and the leak of the Abu Ghraib
scandal57 on one side of the line, and Lewis Libby's conversation with
Matt Cooper about Valerie Plame58 and James Taricani's leak of grand
jury evidence in Rhode Island,59 on the other.60 Although this rule will
inevitably involve some uncertainty in marginal cases, it would apply
only in cases in which the leak is itself unlawful, so any chilling effect
would be of relatively minor concern.
VI. CONCLUSION
I will conclude with a few specific observations. First, when is a
communication between a source and a journalist "confidential"? Not
every conversation is confidential. To meet this standard, the journalist
must either expressly promise confidentiality, or the circumstances and
content of the conversation must be such that the source would
reasonably assume confidentiality. Needless to say, journalists should
promise confidentiality only when necessary, only when such a promise
56. See, e.g., Landmark Commc'ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978) (holding that
the government cannot prohibit the publication of confidential information); Nebraska Press Ass'n
v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (holding that the government cannot prohibit the publication of
confessions and other facts strongly implicative of the accused in a criminal case); New York Times
Co., 403 U.S. at 714 (holding that the government could not enjoin publication of the Pentagon
Papers).
57. See, e.g., Dana Priest & Joe Stephens, Secret World of U.S. Interrogation, WASH. POST,
May 11, 2004, at Al.
58. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 966-67 (D.C. Cir. 2005);
David Johnston & Richard W. Stevenson, Prosecutor Narrows Focus on Rove Role in C.I.A. Leak,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2005, at Al.
59. See In re Special Proceedings, 373 F.3d 37, 40-41 (1 st Cir. 2004).
60. This is a higher standard of newsworthiness than the Supreme Court has applied in
deciding when the press has a First Amendment right to publish or broadcast information obtained
from unlawful sources. See Barticki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534-35 (2001) (holding that a radio
commentator could not constitutionally be held liable for damages for broadcasting an unlawfully
recorded telephone call, where the broadcast involved "truthful information of public concern").
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is consistent with the law, and only according to prevailing professional
standards.
Second, to reiterate a point I made earlier, reporters have no legal or
moral right to promise confidentiality beyond what is recognized in the
law. Such promises should always be interpreted as "subject to the rule
of law." It is the responsibility of the source as well as the reporter to
understand that the reporter cannot legally promise more than the law
allows. If a reporter expressly promises more than the law allows, that
promise is legally ineffective, like any other promise that is contrary to
public policy. A reporter who knowingly deceives a source by promising
more than the law authorizes is properly subject to professional
discipline and civil liability to the source.
Third, supporters of an absolute journalist-source privilege argue
that anything less than an absolute privilege will "chill" free expression.
Certainly, this is true. Some disclosures that should not occur will be
chilled, and some disclosures that should occur will be chilled. The
former is the reason for a less than absolute privilege; the latter is the
cost of a less than absolute privilege.
It is in the nature of free speech that it is easily discouraged. Most
people know that their decision to participate in public debate by
attending a demonstration, signing a petition, or disclosing information
to the press is unlikely to change the world in any measurable way.
Except in extraordinary circumstances, any one person's participation
will have no discernable impact. As a consequence, any risk of penalty
for speech will often cause individuals to forego their right of free
expression. This is a serious concern whenever we shape rules about
public discourse.
But this argument can be made against any restriction of free
expression. Taken to its logical conclusion, it means that no restriction
of speech is ever permissible, because every restriction will chill some
speech that should not be chilled. The chilling effect argument must be
used with some restraint. As I have already suggested, in my view, in
part because of chilling effect concerns, the complete absence of a
federal journalist-source privilege is indefensible and the qualified
journalist-source privilege strikes the wrong balance. But an absolute
privilege may go too far.
A rule that limits the privilege (a) when the government can
convincingly demonstrate it needs the information to prevent an
imminent and grave crime or threat to the national security or (b) when
the disclosure is unlawful and does not substantially contribute to public
debate seems to me to strike the right balance. It unduly sacrifices
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neither compelling law enforcement interests nor the equally compelling
interests in promoting a free and independent press and a robust public
discourse.
Finally, in light of the substantial interstate effects of the media, it
seems appropriate and sensible for Congress to enact a shield law that
governs not only federal proceedings, but state and local proceedings as
well. Because of the interstate nature of modern communications, a
common set of expectations among sources, journalists, law enforcement
officials, and courts is essential, and federal legislation is the best way to
achieve this result.
6
'
61. Under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, ci. 2, states could not offer a weaker
journalist-source privilege than that provided in such federal legislation, but they could of course
offer a more protective privilege for state and local proceedings. See, e.g., Hillsborough County v.
Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-13 (1985) (holding that state laws are only
preempted when in conflict with federal law or regulations). Thus, such a law would not interfere
with the thirteen states that currently recognize an absolute journalist-source privilege.
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